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In tournament models, individuals respond to the opportunity to win prizes by assessing their chances of winning, the size of the prizes, and the cost of the effort 
in undertaking the tournament task. Models of tournament behavior predict that 
the aggregate effort of individuals in the tournament may be maximized by giving 
multiple prizes rather than a single prize, given a constant total tournament purse, 
heterogeneous skills, and a sufficiently convex cost for participants of putting forth 
effort (Benny Moldovanu and Aner Sela 2001, hereafter M&S). Multiple prizes give 
more participants an incentive to try hard than a single large prize, which many 
participants may have little chance of winning. Prizes unrelated to output produce 
low effort as participants see no return to effort. However, there is little empirical 
work examining how behavior responds to differing prize structures or to infor-
mation about participants’ level of ability at the tournament task. Behavioral eco-
nomics adds potential twists to traditional tournament theory, including suggesting 
that incentives may crowd out intrinsic motivation (Uri Gneezy and Aldo Rustichini 
2000).
To assess behavior under different tournament prize structures and different 
information given to participants, we use a maze solving experiment that approxi-
mates important features of real world tournaments in which individuals with dif-
fering ability compete for prizes. We asked groups of six subjects to solve a set of 
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Prize Structure and Information in Tournaments: 
Experimental Evidence†
By Richard B. Freeman and Alexander M. Gelber*
This paper examines behavior in a tournament in which we vary 
the tournament prize structure and the available information about 
participants’ skill at the task of solving mazes. The number of solved 
mazes is lowest when payments are independent of performance; 
higher when a single, large prize is given; and highest when mul-
tiple, differentiated prizes are given. This result is strongest when 
we inform participants about the number of mazes they and others 
solved in a pre-tournament round. Some participants reported that 
they solved more mazes than they actually solved, and this misre-
porting also peaked with multiple differentiated prizes. (JEL D82)
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mazes in two rounds.1 In Round 1, we rewarded individuals by piece rates so that 
their reward depended only on their own performance. After the groups completed 
Round 1, we told participants in half of the groups about the distribution of mazes 
solved in Round 1 in their group, but we did not tell participants in the other half of 
the groups about the distribution in their groups. In Round 2, we gave three incentive 
treatments: a treatment that paid each person the same regardless of performance; a 
treatment with one large prize for the tournament winner; and a treatment with mul-
tiple prizes that increased with a participant’s rank in the tournament. Total prize 
money was constant across the three incentive treatments. We measured the effects 
of the six treatments (three prize treatments in each information environment) on 
effort by measuring the number of mazes individuals solved.
Using the total number of mazes solved as a measure of output, we find that 
output is lowest when payments to participants are independent of performance; 
higher when only a single large prize is given; and highest when we give multiple 
differentiated prizes. While we cannot pinpoint the prize structure corresponding to 
the global maximum of output among the infinite number of possible allocations of 
a fixed tournament prize budget, our results demonstrate that multiple differentiated 
prizes in some form can produce higher output than either one single prize, or prizes 
unrelated to performance.
We also find that the information individuals have about how they and others per-
formed in Round 1 of the experiment affected responses to the incentive conditions. 
The maximum under multiple prizes is strongest when we inform participants about 
the number of mazes they and others solved in Round 1. The differences in output 
among the conditions are, moreover, driven largely by the different responses to 
incentives of subjects with high or low maze solving ability, seemingly in response 
to the different marginal returns to effort in specific prize and information settings. 
When subjects knew the distribution of solved mazes from Round 1, those lower 
in the ability distribution solved more mazes with multiple prizes than they did 
with the single prize condition. By contrast, those higher in the ability distribution 
solved similar numbers of mazes with multiple prizes as they did under the single 
prize condition. Lower-ability subjects produced little when they knew they had 
little chance of winning a single prize through more effort. When subjects did not 
know the distribution of solved mazes from Round 1, the single and multiple prize 
treatments produced similar outcomes across the ability distribution, suggesting that 
when individuals did not know they ranked poorly in ability, they did not “give up” 
on winning the single prize.
The paper and pencil maze technology that we used in our experiment allowed 
subjects to falsely report unsolved mazes as solved. This serendipitously provides 
an independent test of the impact of incentives on behavior and a new approach 
to detecting cheating in the laboratory. As some form of cheating is widespread in 
many real world contexts (e.g., Brian A. Jacob and Steven D. Levitt 2003), our exper-
iment provides an analog to a common setting. It relates to the multitask settings 
analyzed in the theory of incentives (Bengt Holmström and Paul Milgrom 1991), in 
1 Gneezy, Muriel Niederle, and Rustichini (2003) use maze solving to gauge the effort of subjects.
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which one of the tasks is reporting outcomes accurately. This could be relevant to a 
recent experience in the financial sector, in which increasingly high-powered incen-
tives for executives seem to underlie increased malfeasance. In our experiment, the 
extent of misreporting varied with incentives in a similar way, as did the number of 
mazes solved.
The experiments closest to ours (Wieland Müller and Andrew Schotter 2004; 
Haig R. Nalbantian and Schotter 1997) examine how tournament prize structure 
affects effort, but not how information interacts with incentives or how incentives 
and information affect individuals with different ability levels.2 Niederle and Lise 
Vesterlund (2007) compare the decisions of men and women to enter a tournament. 
Ronald G. Ehrenberg and Michael L. Bognanno (1990) find that golf tournaments 
have incentive effects, but do not study the provision of information or which dis-
tribution of prizes maximizes effort. Other recent analyses connected to our work 
include Moldovanu, Sela, and Xianwen Shi (2007), who investigate the theory of 
tournaments in the presence of status concerns; Tor Eriksson, Anders Poulsen, and 
Marie-Claire Villeval (2008), who study the effect of feedback on performance 
under piece rates and tournaments; and Oriana Bandiera, Iwan Barankay, and Imran 
Rasul (2005) and Clive Bull, Schotter, and Keith Weigelt (1987), who compare piece 
rates and tournaments.
Section I describes the experiment. Section II presents the main results. Section 
III discusses results related to cheating in the experiment. Section IV concludes.
I. The Experiment
Our experiment recruited participants from a Harvard Business School Computer 
Lab for Experimental Research subject pool. We asked subjects to solve a set of 
mazes from Dave Phillips (1988, 1991) in a group with six participants. Groups 
gathered outside the room of the experiment and entered together, and subjects could 
observe that they were competing in a group with five others. The experiment had 
two rounds, each lasting for 15 minutes: a piece rate incentive session (Round 1) 
and a tournament session (Round 2). The maze packet used for Round 2 contained 
different mazes than those in the maze packet for Round 1. We presented the mazes 
to all subjects in the same order. The directions for each round and treatment are in 
the Appendix.
The participants were paid a $13 show-up fee for participating in the experiment. 
In Round 1, we paid each subject an additional 20 cents per maze solved to moti-
vate effort. We used the results under piece rates to identify their skill at solving 
mazes. At the end of Round 1, we told subjects in half of the groups the scores of all 
group members in Round 1. Since individuals knew their own score, this informa-
tion allowed them to place themselves in the distribution and assess their chances 
of ranking high or low in Round 2. We refer to this treatment as “full information” 
because it gives subjects all the information that we have relevant to assessing their 
chances of winning in the ensuing tournament. In the other half of the experiments, 
2 Müller and Schotter (2004) find that some participants work hard in tournaments while others effectively 
drop out. Nalbantian and Schotter (1997) find that relative performance schemes outperform target-based schemes.
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which we refer to as “no information,” we said nothing about how others performed. 
In all treatments, we announced the Round 2 prize structures after Round 1 was 
complete.
In Round 2, subjects competed in a tournament with three incentive treatments, 
each of which distributed $30 in total prizes to each group. Our equal prize treat-
ment gave each participant $5 regardless of performance. The only incentive was 
the intrinsic desire to solve mazes or to do well relative to others. Our single prize 
treatment gave $30 to the top scorer and nothing to anyone else. In the multiple prize 
condition, we gave multiple, differentiated prizes. Out of the many ways to do this, 
we chose one that gave incentives to persons in all parts of the distribution of maze-
solving skill as reflected in their Round 1 maze performances. We gave the first 
prize winner $15, the second prize winner $7, the third prize winner $5, the fourth 
prize winner $2, and the fifth prize winner $1. The experiment took approximately 
50 minutes. Mean total earnings, including the show-up fee, Round 1 earnings, and 
Round 2 earnings, were $20.45.
We presented the exercise to the subjects in paper and pencil form. We asked sub-
jects to report the number of mazes they solved and told them that they had to solve 
them in the order they were presented in the packet. Initially, we did not consider 
that subjects might cheat, for example, by jumping over a line to complete a maze, or 
that some would misreport the mazes solved by counting the mazes they solved after 
they had skipped one as completed. When we checked the first sets of maze packets, 
we found discrepancies between the number of mazes subjects reported solving and 
the mazes that our rules would count as solved. We considered redoing the experi-
ment in ways that would rule out such activity (for instance, by using a computer 
maze design) but realized that the potential for cheating serendipitously provides a 
second test of the effect of incentives on cheating in a tournament that differs greatly 
from the type of evidence in other experimental studies of cheating, such as studies 
on taxes.3 The fact that cheating arose underscores the importance of examining its 
role in tournament settings and highlights a sometimes neglected aspect of incentive 
pay—the fact that incentives not only increase the reward to legitimate effort but 
also the reward to misreporting and cheating.
incentives and potential Behavior in the Experiment.—The performance of indi-
viduals in maze-solving depends on their ability and the effort they expend. The indi-
vidual controls his or her effort. With total mazes solved in the group as the measure 
of output, the relation between output and the prize structure in a tournament setting 
depends on the distribution of participants’ abilities, their perceived probability that 
increased effort will earn them a prize, and the values of the prizes. In the model 
of Edward P. Lazear and Sherwin Rosen (1981), participants have equal ability, and 
the optimal prize for winning mimics an optimal piece rate. In the M&S model, 
participants have  heterogeneous ability levels.4 In this analysis, multiple prizes can 
3 Studies on cheating on taxes ask subjects to choose a level of cheating or shirking and explicitly state the 
reward or punishment scheme they will face, see James Alm, Gary H. McClelland, and William D. Schulze 
(1992).
4 Vijay Krishna and John Morgan (1998) also study settings with multiple prizes.
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lead to greater output than a single prize because individuals with little chance of 
winning the single prize put in greater effort when they can win the second, third, 
or “nth” prize. The most able person may be less motivated by the presence of other 
prizes since the return to coming in first will be less than with a single prize, but 
less able contestants will be motivated by the rewards from doing better in the lower 
part of the prize distribution. M&S show that with a sufficiently convex cost of effort 
function, total effort is maximized in a setting with multiple prizes.5
The information structure of the tournament should affect behavior as well. In 
the M&S model, individuals know the distribution function from which abilities 
are drawn. This enables those with high ability to assess their chances of winning. 
Assuming that individuals in the no information conditions have correct priors over 
the distribution of ability, then the M&S information setting mimics the no infor-
mation condition. Our experiment has a stronger information condition. In the full 
information case, individuals know the realized values of the abilities of other con-
testants. This approximates an alternative, and arguably more common, set of real 
world conditions in which participants have a better idea of their potential for win-
ning than in the M&S model, where they only know the distribution function from 
which competitors are drawn. This should affect the perceived probability that a 
given individual will win a prize. For instance, causing someone who is in a tourna-
ment with others with much higher Round 1 scores to put in low effort in the single 
prize condition as they perceive a low probability of winning the single prize.
II. Findings
Table 1 summarizes the means and standard deviations of subjects’ scores in 
each treatment and both rounds of the experiment.6 Since we randomly assigned 
individuals to treatments and gave the same Round 1 piece-rate incentive to all sub-
jects, Round 1 scores should not differ noticeably among the groups. The Round 
1 means show the different groups solved similar numbers of mazes. f-tests and 
pair-wise two-tailed Mann-Whitney u-tests confirm that there are no statistically 
different results in this round.7 The Round 2 means show noticeable differences in 
scores among the treatment groups, which are significant by f-tests and pair-wise 
two-tailed Mann-Whitney u-tests. In the full information treatment, mean prizes 
solved rises from the equal prize to the multiple prize condition, and then fall with 
the one prize treatment. In the no information treatment, the lowest mean score is 
in the equal prize group, but the one prize group and the multiple prize group have 
5 This is M&S (2001) Proposition 5, p. 549.
6 We specified that the “mazes you solve that follow mazes you skipped will not be included in your total 
number of mazes,” but some participants ignored this instruction and proceeded to solve mazes after failing to 
solve one, perhaps intending to go back and solve that one later. Thus, one measure of output is the number of 
mazes that subjects completed even when some solved mazes followed unsolved mazes. A second measure of 
output is the number of mazes a subject solved prior to skipping a maze. The first measure provides a potentially 
better indicator of the effort induced by the treatment, while the second follows our instructions. See Freeman and 
Gelber (2006) for an analysis of the second measure, as well as an analysis of the number of mazes solved in the 
second round, as reported by the subjects. We obtain results similar to those reported in this paper, which uses the 
number of mazes that subjects completed even when some solved mazes followed unsolved mazes. We exclude 
misreported mazes from the totals and examine them in Section III.
7 For all three possible pairs of conditions, the pairwise test shows p > 0.40.
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similar mean outputs.8 Comparing the full information and no information treat-
ments, mean mazes solved are higher in the equal prize and multiple prize treat-
ments under full information (15.55 and 18.56) than they are under no information 
(12.88 and 16.36, respectively), which is statistically significant at p = 0.02 and p 
= 0.07, respectively. By contrast, the results under full information and under no 
information are not discernibly different for the single prize treatment (16.10 versus 
16.53, respectively; p = 0.58).
A. regression Analysis
To probe the Table 1 finding that multiple prizes produce higher output for the full 
information case, but not for the no information case, we use regression analysis for 
ease of presentation. We regressed the change in the number of mazes solved from 
Round 1 to Round 2 on a constant term and dummy variables for treatments:
 (r 2i − r1i  ) = β0 + Iiβ + εi,
8 In the no information condition, the two-tailed Mann-Whitney test for the single prize versus equal prize 
distribution shows p = 0.001; multiple prize versus equal prize shows p = 0.008; equal prize versus single prize 
shows p = 0.78. In the full information condition, the two-tailed Mann-Whitney test for the single prize versus 
equal prize group shows p = 0.73; multiple prize versus equal prize shows p = 0.008; multiple prize versus single 
prize shows p = 0.04.
Table 1—Means and Standard Deviations of Individuals’ Mazes Solved and 
Mazes Misreported, by Treatment
Treatment
Mean (SD) mazes 
solved
Mean (SD) mazes 
misreported 
Round 1
(1)
Round 2
(2)
Round 1
(3)
Round 2
(4)
full information
Equal prize 12.65
(4.86)
15.55
(7.08)
0.09
(0.33)
0.18
(0.58)
Multiple prize 12.40
(4.44)
18.56
(6.87)
0.13
(0.54)
0.51
(1.44)
Single prize 11.74
(5.24)
16.10
(7.88)
0.19
(1.20)
0.46
(1.15)
no information
Equal prize 12.46
(4.68)
12.88
(5.62)
0.09
(0.33)
0.13
(0.49)
Multiple prize 11.91
(5.27)
16.36
(7.89)
0.17
(0.84)
0.32
(1.62)
Single prize 12.31
(5.05)
16.53
(7.38)
0.12
(0.39)
0.23
(0.68)
note: The sample size is 78 subjects for each of the 6 treatments shown, and 468 subjects total.
Source: Tabulated from the experiment described in the text.
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where (r 2i − r1i ) represents the change in score from Round 1 to Round 2, Ii is a 
vector of dummies representing the incentive treatments, ε is an error term, and i 
is an individual indicator. Table 2 reports the estimated coefficients and standard 
errors relating the change in the number of mazes solved from Round 1 to Round 
2 to the prize treatment, and, where relevant, a dummy variable for full informa-
tion. The deleted group in all of the regressions is the equal prize treatment. Those 
who solved more mazes in Round 1 tended to solve more mazes in Round 2, with a 
correlation for all subjects of 0.74, indicating that the Round 1 score is a reasonable 
indicator of the person’s maze solving ability or, alternatively, of their intrinsic effort 
independent of incentives.9 The coefficient on the full information treatment in col-
umn 1 is positive, indicating that, on average, the provision of information improved 
performance.
The key result from the Table 2 regressions is that output is highest under the 
multiple prize condition. The regression coefficients in column 1 for all treatments 
show a strong difference among the incentive treatments. The mazes solved by the 
equal prize group are substantially less than those solved by subjects in the other 
two treatments, and the multiple prize group has a higher number of mazes solved 
than the single prize group. When the sample is divided by information treatment in 
columns 2 and 3, the difference in coefficients between the multiple prize and single 
prize treatment dummies is larger in the full information case (a difference of 1.81 
9 Note that in the experimental context we intend the term “ability” to refer explicitly to the Round 1 score. 
The key for our empirical analysis is that knowledge of other participants’ Round 1 scores allows individuals to 
assess their chance of winning different prizes in Round 2. 
Table 2—Regression Coefficients and Standard Errors for Determinants of 
Change in Mazes Solved from Round 1 to Round 2
All participants
(1)
No info
(2)
Full info
(3)
EQUAL — — —
MULTIPLE 3.65
(0.61)*** 
4.03
(0.79)***
3.27
(0.93)***
SINGLE 2.63
(0.60)***
3.79
(0.74)***
1.46
(0.89)
FULL INFO 1.44
(0.52)***
Constant 0.94
(0.45)**
0.42
(0.51)
2.90
(0.50)***
r2 0.11 0.14 0.07
Observations 468 234 234
notes: The dependent variable is the change in the number of mazes solved from Round 1 to 
Round 2. EQUAL, MULTIPLE, and SINGLE represent dummies for the equal, multiple, and 
single prize conditions, respectively; FULL INFO represents a dummy for full information 
conditions. Robust standard errors, clustered by group, are in parentheses. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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in column 3) than in the no information case (a difference of 0.24 in column 2).10 
This suggests that the prediction in the M&S model, that multiple prizes maximize 
output, is stronger under full information, as opposed to the setting they explored 
that did not examine the effect of the provision of such information.
To probe the robustness of this result, we investigated other specifications. We had 
data on the gender of subjects, and added a female dummy variable to the regression 
with little impact on the other coefficients.11 We regressed the Round 2 score on 
the Round 1 score and the treatments. We entered the square of the Round 1 score 
along with the Round 1 score in the regressions. We excluded from the analysis 
data from those groups in which at least one person misreported a maze in Round 
1. We introduced the Round 1 score of the highest scoring person in the group as 
an independent variable on the hypothesis that this could affect performances in the 
full information condition. We aggregated the mazes solved to the group level and 
regressed the change in total mazes solved by each group from Round 1 to Round 
2 on the treatment dummies. As an alternative specification, we calculated changes 
in the mean number of mazes solved from Round 1 to Round 2 for each of the treat-
ments and used this as the dependent variable. We investigated gender differences 
by estimating the models in Table 2 with the addition of a gender dummy and the 
interaction of that dummy with each of the five incentive treatments. None of the 
interactions was significant at the 5 percent level.12
B. unpacking the results
At the heart of the analysis linking outcomes to incentive treatments is the notion 
that different prize structures should affect individuals differently depending on 
their maze-solving skills, assuming they are aware of their skills relative to others in 
the tournament. We investigate the impact of treatments on individuals in different 
positions in the maze-solving ability distribution by dividing the sample into those in 
the upper half of the distribution of mazes solved in Round 1 in the group in which 
they participated, and those in the lower half of the group.
Table 3 shows the estimated regression coefficients and standard errors from this 
analysis. The coefficients under the columns labeled top half and bottom half of the 
Round 1 distribution show different effects of the treatments. Under full informa-
tion, in the bottom half, the single prize treatment is associated with a substantially 
smaller coefficient than the multiple prize treatment (−0.12 and 4.22, respectively).
10 When we replicate Table 2 with the multiple prize dummy as the omitted category, we find the follow-
ing: the dependent variable is significantly lower in the equal prize condition than the multiple prize condition 
( p < 0.001) when pooling both information settings and controlling for the dummy for the full information 
setting; output is insignificantly lower in the single prize condition than the multiple prize condition ( p = 0.14) 
in this setting; in the no information setting, output is significantly lower in the equal prize condition than the 
multiple prize condition ( p < 0.001) and insignificantly lower in the single prize condition than the multiple prize 
condition ( p > 0.40); in the full information setting, output is significantly lower in the equal prize condition than 
the multiple prize condition ( p < 0.001), and barely insignificantly lower in the single prize condition than the 
multiple prize condition ( p = 0.10).
11 Gneezy, Niederle, and Rustichini’s (2003) findings suggest that women may perform differently in tourna-
ments than men.
12 See the Web Appendix. The same robustness checks also did not materially affect the Table 3 and Table 4 
results.
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By contrast, in the top half, under full information, there is a slightly larger coeffi-
cient on the single prize treatment than there is on the multiple prize treatment (2.71 
and 2.45, respectively). Knowledge of their low chance of winning the single prize 
seemingly discouraged people in the lower half of the distribution while encourag-
ing those in the upper half. As a result, the maximum associated with the multiple 
prize condition is pronounced for the bottom half of the distribution, but absent from 
the top half of the distribution.
The results for the no information treatment are different. Individuals in the top 
half of the distribution score more under single-prize and multiple-prize incentives 
than individuals in the equal prize group. There is little evidence of a maximum 
under multiple prizes in the bottom half of the distribution as the score for the mul-
tiple prize treatment somewhat exceeds that for the equal prize, and just exceeds 
that for the single prize treatment. Provision of information has its biggest effect on 
individuals in the bottom half of the Round 1 distribution of maze-solving scores. 
Knowledge that they have little chance of winning a single, large prize appears to 
discourage them.
One other pattern in the data requires explanation. This is the higher scores of 
subjects in the full information equal prize group compared to the scores of subjects 
in the no information equal prize (deleted) group. The unadjusted mean differences 
in Table 1 are significantly different in the two conditions, and a regression control-
ling for Round 1 score also shows a significant difference. Since subjects gained no 
Table 3—Regression Coefficients and Standard Errors for Determinants of Change in Mazes 
Solved from Round 1 to Round 2, by Position in Round 1
Round 1 
top half, no 
information
(1)
Round 1 top 
half, full 
information
(2)
Round 1 
bottom 
half, no 
information
(3)
Round 1 
bottom 
half, full 
information
(4)
Round 1 
rank = 1, no 
information
(5)
Round 1 rank 
= 1, full 
information
(6)
Round 1 
rank = 6, no 
information
(7)
Round 1 rank 
= 6, full 
information
(8)
EQUAL — — — — — — — —
MULTIPLE 5.70
(1.03)***
2.45
(1.31)*
1.98
(0.87)**
4.22
(1.06)***
5.89
(2.16)**
3.33
(1.49)**
1.67
(0.92)*
3.83
(1.54)**
SINGLE 5.35
(1.02)***
2.71
(1.42)*
1.95
(1.01)* −0.12(0.95)
5.75
(1.71)***
3.26
(1.65)*
4.31
(1.29)***
0.91
(1.31)
Constant −0.27
(0.69)
3.34
(0.76)***
1.32
(0.60)**
2.41
(0.68)*** −0.69(1.48)
3.27
(0.90)***
0.42
(0.55)
2.09
(0.96)**
r2 0.22 0.05 0.05 0.20 0.22 0.09 0.29 0.19
Observations 127 127 107 107 47 47 35 36
notes: The dependent variable is the change in the number of mazes solved from Round 1 to Round 2. EQUAL, 
MULTIPLE, and SINGLE represent dummies for the equal, multiple, and single prize conditions, respectively. 
Columns 1 and 2 display results for regressions including participants with Round 1 score ranked between 1 and 
3 (inclusive); columns 3 and 4 display results for a regression in which the sample is all participants with Round 
1 ranks 4 to 6 (inclusive). The sample size is larger for the top half than the bottom half because tied scores were 
assigned the same rank; results are similar with other ways of assigning ties. This is also the reason that the sam-
ple size is larger for those ranked 1 in Round 1 (columns 5 and 6) than those ranked 6 in Round 1 (columns 7 and 
8). Odd numbered columns restrict the sample to no information conditions, and even numbered to full informa-
tion conditions. Robust standard errors, clustered by group, are in parentheses.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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money from solving more mazes in the equal prize treatment, pecuniary incentives 
cannot account for this result. One possible explanation is that individuals at the 
low end realized they could do better in the full information treatment and tried 
harder due to intrinsic competitive motivation. Niederle and Vesterlund’s (2007) 
finding that men respond more competitively to tournaments than women is consis-
tent with the hypothesis that men are more subject to an intrinsic motivation effect. 
Looking at our data by gender, we find a pattern consistent with this hypothesis. In 
the equal prize treatment, men raised their scores more in the full information case 
than women did. In the equal prize treatment, the mean Round 1 to Round 2 gain in 
scores was 2.16 more in full information than in no information for men, whereas it 
was 1.30 more for women ( p < 0.05).
As a final check on the differential response to the treatments of subjects in dif-
ferent positions in the maze-scoring distribution, we report, in columns 5–8 of Table 
3, the coefficients on treatments for the person who scored highest in their group in 
Round 1 and the person who scored lowest in their group in Round 1. In both the 
full information and no information cases, the individuals who did best in Round 1 
increased their scores more in the multiple prize and single prize treatment than in 
the equal prize treatment, while those who did the worst in Round 1 improved their 
scores most in the full information multiple prize treatment. Comparing the differ-
ence in scores between full information and no information, those with high scores 
increased their scores from the no information to the full information treatment 
by the greatest amount in the equal prize case and the smallest amount in the mul-
tiple prize case. By contrast, the lowest scoring subjects in Round 1 increased their 
scores most from no information to full information in the multiple prize treatment, 
presumably because they realized that they had a chance to win some reward from 
greater effort. By contrast, they reduced their scores from the no information to the 
full information treatments in the single prize treatment, presumably because they 
realized they had little chance to win the single prize.13
III. Incentives and Misreporting/Cheating
By asking subjects to solve paper mazes in which the subjects use a pencil to 
draw lines from the beginning of the maze to the end, we created another test of how 
incentives affect behavior by opening the door for misreporting or cheating.14 Our 
instructions told subjects to solve the mazes in the order that they appeared in their 
packets and that “any mazes you solve that follow a maze you skipped will not be 
counted in your total number of mazes…” We also told subjects that “solving a maze 
means drawing a continuous line from the place marked ‘Start’ to the place marked 
13 In some situations, the top score from a group may matter rather than the sum of all the scores. Using a 
group’s top score to measure output, we still find that multiple prizes produce the greatest output, though the dif-
ference between multiple prizes and the single prize is smaller than in the comparable regression in Table 3. In 
other situations, the performance of the lower scoring individual may matter most. Under full information, the 
multiple prize condition gives markedly higher results than the other treatments, due to the incentives that mul-
tiple prizes give in the lowest part of the distribution. See Freeman and Gelber (2006).
14 Breaking the rules of a maze solving experiment is not possible when subjects solve mazes on the computer, 
as in previous literature. 
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‘Finish,’ without crossing any of the walls of the maze with your line.” Finally, we 
asked subjects to report the number of mazes they solved according to those rules.
Reviewing the packets of solved mazes after the first set of experiments, we dis-
covered that subjects sometimes reported more mazes solved than met our rules. 
The vast majority of misreporting consisted of subjects starting a maze but not fin-
ishing it, then moving on to subsequent mazes in their maze packet, and reporting 
the subsequent mazes in their total number solved. There were three other less fre-
quent forms of misreporting. Some subjects completely skipped a maze, yet reported 
subsequent mazes they solved in the number solved. Some subjects crossed one of 
the walls of a maze with a line, yet counted this maze among the total number they 
solved. And, some subjects reported a different total number solved than the total 
they actually solved. The results we report include all four types of cheating, but all 
types of cheating show similar patterns across treatments.15
The final two columns of Table 1 present summary statistics on the frequency of 
such misreporting. In Round 1, the largest number of misreports occurred under the 
full information multiple prize treatment. But f- or chi-squared tests of the effect of 
the treatments show no statistically significant difference among the groups in this 
round. By contrast, the means for Round 2 show that misreporting is higher in the 
full information treatment than in the no information treatment ( p = 0.006). This is 
presumably because people in full information have a better idea of how they might 
improve their chances of gaining a prize by misreporting. In both the full informa-
tion case and the no information case, the mean number of misreports is several 
times larger in the multiple-prize and single-prize treatments compared with the 
equal prize treatment. In both the full information and no information setting, the 
largest number of misreports is associated with the multiple prize condition. Thus, 
incentives seem to work in a similar way in misreporting as they do in genuine maze 
solving.
Table 4 presents the coefficients and standard errors from a Poisson regression 
in which the dependent variable is the number of misreports in Round 2. We use 
the Poisson model because misreports are a relatively infrequent event.16 In the full 
information case, the regressions show that misreporting is greatest in the multiple 
prize setting, second highest in the single prize setting, and lowest in the equal-
prize condition (column 1). Looking at behavior among subjects in the upper and 
lower halves of the distribution of maze-solving in Round 1, the regression coef-
ficients in columns 2 and 3 show that this result is due to much higher misreporting 
by individuals in the multiple- and single-prize treatments than those in the equal 
15 Some of the misreporting may have represented unintentional mistakes, but the empirical results show that 
misreporting varies strongly with incentives, and this cannot be reconciled with random mistakes. With random 
mistakes, we would expect to find occasional underreporting, but we did not find underreporting. Moreover, it 
seems reasonable that if one starts a maze, does not finish it, but reports this maze as solved in one’s total number 
of mazes, then this is intentional. When we limit the measure of cheating to only those misreports that involved 
this form of misreporting, we find similar patterns to those reported. 
16 Negative binomial regressions show similar results to the Poisson regressions. A linear model shows dif-
ferences among the treatments with similar magnitudes to those implied by the unadjusted differences shown 
in Table 1. Adding individuals’ Round 1 score to the model does not appreciably change the results. Since the 
Poisson specification involves maximizing a nonlinear likelihood function, we would face an incidental param-
eters problem if we first-differenced the dependent variable as in Tables 2 and 3. Thus, we control for Round 1 
fudges as an independent variable.
160 AmEricAn Economic JournAL: AppLiEd EconomicS JAnuArY 2010
prize treatment for those at the upper half of the distribution and a low number of 
misreports among individuals in the single-prize treatment in the bottom half of the 
distribution. When a lot of prize money is at stake, and participants know that they 
have a chance of winning, they are more likely to cheat to win. By contrast, there are 
no statistically significant differences in misreporting in the no information treat-
ment. Moreover, the percentage difference in cheating across treatments is greater 
than the percentage differences across treatments in output.17
IV. Conclusion
This paper has examined the impact of tournament prize structure and provision 
of information about individuals’ skill. The first round of the experiment gave all 
participants the same piece -ate incentive. The second round varied the incentives 
and information about the number of mazes solved by participants in the pre-tour-
nament round. The experiment found that multiple prizes elicited more effort than a 
single prize or equal prizes. It is worth noting that the most unequal compensation 
system—giving only one large prize—did not always maximize aggregate effort. 
The most equal system, giving multiple prizes of equal value, also did not always 
17 This is consistent with Jacob and Levitt (2003), who find that cheating is extremely sensitive to the incen-
tives to cheat.
Table 4—Poisson Regression Coefficients and Standard Errors for Determinants of Total 
Number of Mazes Misreported in Round 2
Full information No information
All subjects
(1)
Top half
(2)
Bottom half
(3)
All subjects
(4)
Top half
(5)
Bottom half
(6)
EQUAL — — — — — —
MULTIPLE 1.01
(0.41)** 
1.29
(0.57)**
0.94
(0.49)*
−0.21
(0.58)
0.33
(0.79)
−0.50
(0.88) 
SINGLE 0.50
(0.43)
1.75
(0.55)***
−0.71
(0.82)
0.55
(0.44)
0.61
(0.76)
0.45
(0.53)
Mazes misreported in
 Round 1
0.38
(0.05)***
1.87
(0.87)**
0.46
(0.09)***
0.74
(0.07)***
0.85
(0.96)
0.72
(0.11)***
Constant −1.76
(0.35)***
−2.56
(0.50)***
−1.39
(0.41)***
−2.16
(0.33)
−2.75
(0.70)***
−1.75
(0.41)***
Observations 234 127 107 234 127 107
Log pseudo-likelihood −177.52 −79.77 −88.16 −102.20 −40.41 −59.31
notes: The number of mazes misreported in Round 2 is regressed on dummies for the incentive conditions, the 
number of mazes misreported in Round 1, and a constant term. Columns 1 and 4 display results for a regression 
in which the sample is all participants; columns 2 and 5 display results for a regression in which the sample is all 
participants with Round 1 ranks 1 to 3 (inclusive); columns 3 and 6 display results for a regression in which the 
sample is all participants with Round 1 ranks 4 to 6 (inclusive). The sample size is larger for the top half than the 
bottom half because tied scores were assigned the same rank; results are similar with other ways of assigning ties. 
Robust standard errors, clustered by group, are in parentheses.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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maximize aggregate effort. In the full information setting, it was a tournament prize 
structure in between these two extremes, giving relatively strong incentives to indi-
viduals throughout the distribution of ability, that maximized aggregate effort. This 
finding is consistent with the spirit of M&S’s analysis that multiple prizes maxi-
mize total effort. The evidence that the multiple prize effect is stronger under full 
information than under no information goes beyond their model because our full 
information treatment gives individuals information about the realized abilities of 
their competitors.
The results were strongest for individuals in the bottom half of the distribution, 
where output fell in the single-prize treatment relative to the multiple-prize treat-
ment. When individuals are aware of their ability relative to others, a single, large 
prize does not motivate those at the bottom of the ability distribution, who have little 
chance of winning it. They put forth more effort when they have a better chance 
to win more in a multiple prize setting. This suggests that theories of tournament 
behavior should focus more on the provision of information than they currently do. 
Our results suggest that under some prize structures it may benefit an employer or 
tournament creator to provide full information about performance while in other 
cases it may not. The evidence that participants solved more mazes in the full infor-
mation no inequality treatment than in the no information no inequality treatment 
suggests that behavior is affected by intrinsic motivation or some other psychologi-
cal factor not typically examined in incentive models. This points to potentially 
fruitful lines of further theoretical and empirical work.
Finally, our experimental design offers a new way to detect cheating without 
alerting participants to the fact that their cheating will be examined by the experi-
menters. The finding that the information and incentive structure affected cheating 
in a similar manner to output raises important issues about analyses of incentive pay. 
The importance of cheating in our experiment suggests the need to model multi-task 
moral hazard or other features of cheating in a tournament setting. Economic analy-
ses of executive compensation, in particular, have typically not focused on the pos-
sibility that incentives not only motivate productive effort but also motivate cheating 
of various forms. It has not escaped our notice that the cheating behavior uncovered 
in our experiment has parallels in the behavior that contributed to the financial melt-
down of Wall Street of 2008. The fact that relatively modest incentives generated as 
much misreporting as we uncovered raises important questions about the respon-
siveness of misreporting and cheating to the much larger stakes outside the labora-
tory. Tournament models that put greater stress on the dual effect of incentives may 
offer greater guidance to firms and policymakers concerned by the possible impact 
of compensation structure on malfeasance.
Appendix
Instructions (Round 1)
Each of you has been given a packet of mazes. Please do not turn this packet 
over until the room monitor says to start. Please write your name on the back of this 
packet.
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“Solving” a maze means that you draw a continuous line from the place on the 
maze marked “Start” to the place marked “Finish,” without crossing any of the walls 
of the maze with your line. All of the mazes in your packets have solutions. Please 
begin working on the first maze in the packet and work through the packet in order. 
Begin working on a new maze only when you have finished solving the maze that 
preceded it in the packet. If you work out of order and skip at least one maze, you 
will not be given credit in your total number of mazes for mazes you solved that 
follow the maze you skipped. We will check the accuracy of your solutions to the 
mazes.
You will have 15 minutes to solve as many mazes as you can. You will receive 20 
cents for each maze you solve (on top of your guaranteed payment of $13 for show-
ing up at the experiment). If, over the course of this session, you make stray lines 
on your sheet that do not lead from the start of the maze to the finish, you are not 
required to erase these lines during the 15-minute session itself, but you may erase 
them if you wish to do so.
Each of you has received a packet of mazes that is identical to the packet each 
other participant has received. It will not be announced at any point in the experi-
ment which participant received which score in this session.
Please do not talk to other participants while you are solving the mazes. Also, 
please do not talk in the break between solving mazes in the packet you have been 
given and solving mazes in the next packet. Please turn off your cellular phones 
before the experiment begins.
If you have a question about these directions, please raise your hand now.
Instructions (read by experimenter after Round 1):
Please count the number of mazes that you solved correctly in the first session, 
and please write this number on the front of your maze packet with a circle around 
it. If you skipped a maze, please do not include subsequent mazes solved in the total 
you report. Please raise your hand when you have finished this, so that the room 
monitor can collect your packet from you.
only in the “full information” Treatments, read: An experimenter will now 
give to each of you a list of the number of mazes each member of your group solved 
in the first session. The number that you solved has been circled, and the numbers 
that the other members of your group solved have not been circled.
Instructions (Round 2):
Each of you has been given a second packet of mazes. Please write your name on 
the back of this packet. Please do not turn this packet over and begin working on it 
until the room monitor says to start.
“Solving” a maze means that you draw a continuous line from the place on the 
maze marked “Start” to the place marked “Finish,” without crossing any of the walls 
of the maze with your line. All of the mazes in your packets have solutions. Please 
begin working on the first maze in the packet and work through the packet in order. 
Begin working on a new maze only when you have finished solving the maze that 
preceded it in the packet. If you work out of order and skip at least one maze, you 
will not be given credit in your total number of mazes for mazes you solved that 
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follow the maze you skipped. We will check the accuracy of your solutions to the 
mazes.
You will have 15 minutes to solve mazes in your packet.
For “Equal prize” Treatments, read:
In this session, which is the final session of the experiment, you will receive $5, 
regardless of how many mazes you solve.
For “Multiple Prize” Treatments, read:
In this session, which is the final session of the experiment, you will be paid 
based on how many mazes you solve, in comparison with how many mazes the other 
participants solve. If you solve the most mazes in this session out of the members 
of this group, you will receive $15, in addition to your show-up fee, plus what you 
earned in the first session. If you solve the second-most mazes in this session out 
of the members of this group, you will receive $7, in addition to your show-up fee, 
plus what you earned in the first session. If you solve the third-most mazes in this 
session out of the members of this group, you will receive $5, in addition to your 
show-up fee, plus what you earned in the first session. If you solve the fourth-most 
mazes in this session out of the members of this group, you will receive $2, in addi-
tion to your show-up fee, plus what you earned in the first session. If you solve the 
fifth-most mazes in this session out of the members of this group, you will receive 
$1, in addition to your show-up fee, plus what you earned in the first session. If you 
solve the sixth-most mazes in this session out of the members of this group, you will 
receive only your show-up fee, plus what you earned in the first session.
Your payment from this session (the second session) will be based only on how 
many mazes you solve in the second session. The number you solved in the first ses-
sion is irrelevant to the payment you receive in this session.
For “Single Prize” Treatments, read:
You will have 15 minutes to solve mazes in your packet. In this session, which 
is the final session of the experiment, you will be paid based on how many mazes 
you solve, in comparison with how many mazes the other participants solve. If you 
solve the most mazes in this session out of the members of this group, you will 
receive $30, in addition to your show-up fee, plus what you earned in the first ses-
sion. Everyone else will receive only their show-up fee, plus what they earned in the 
previous session.
Your payment from this session (the second session) will be based only on how 
many mazes you solve in the second session. The number you solved in the first ses-
sion is irrelevant to the payment you receive in this session.
In all treatments, read:
Each of you has received a packet of mazes that is identical to the packet each 
other participant has received. It will not be announced at any point in the experi-
ment which participant received which score in this session. Please do not talk while 
you are solving the mazes.
If you have a question about these directions, please raise your hand now.
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